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Abstract
Background: Diabetes is an increasing public health problem in the UK and globally. Diabetic retinopathy is a
microvascular complication of diabetes, and is one of the leading causes of blindness in the UK working age
population. The diabetic eye screening programme in England aims to invite all people with diabetes aged 12 or
over for retinal photography to screen for the presence of diabetic retinopathy. However, attendance rates are only
81 %, leaving many people at risk of preventable sight loss.
Methods: This is a three arm randomized controlled trial to investigate the impact of different types of financial
incentives (based on principles from behavioral economics) on increasing attendance at diabetic eye screening
appointments in London. Eligible participants will be aged 16 or over, and are those who have been invited to
screening appointments annually, but who have not attended, or telephoned to rearrange an appointment, within
the last 24 months.
Eligible participants will be randomized to one of three conditions:
1. Control condition (usual invitation letter)
2. Fixed incentive condition (usual invitation letter, including a voucher for £10 if they attend their appointment)
3. Probabilistic incentive condition (invitation letter, including a voucher for a 1 in 100 chance of winning £1000
if they attend their appointment).
Participants will be sent invitation letters, and the primary outcome will be whether or not they attend their
appointment. One thousand participants will be included in total, randomized with a ratio of 1.4:1:1. In order to test
whether the incentive scheme has a differential impact on patients from different demographic or socio-economic
groups, information will be recorded on age, gender, distance from screening center, socio-economic status and
length of time since they were last screened. A cost-effectiveness analysis will also be performed.
(Continued on next page)
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Discussion: This study will be the first trial of financial incentives for improving uptake of diabetic eye screening. If
effective, the intervention may suggest a cost-effective way to increase screening rates, thus reducing unnecessary
blindness.
Trial registration: ISRCTN14896403, 25 February 2016
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Background
Diabetes is an increasing public health concern world-
wide, with an estimated 380 million adults with diabetes
globally [1]. This corresponds to 8.3 % of the world’s
adult population, and is expected to rise to over 10 % by
2035. Recent data suggests that over 4 million people in
the UK now have diabetes [2].
All patients with diabetes are at risk of developing dia-
betic retinopathy. This condition is caused by damage to
small blood vessels at the back of the eyes, which re-
duces the blood supply. This stimulates the growth of
fragile, new blood vessels in the eye, which may bleed
and damage the retina, leading to sight loss. It is esti-
mated that in England every year 4,200 people are at risk
of blindness caused by diabetic retinopathy and there
are 1,280 new cases of blindness caused by diabetic ret-
inopathy [3]. It is one of the leading causes of sight loss
in the UK in the working population [4] and therefore
there is a significant social and financial burden associ-
ated with the condition. However, timely diagnosis and
treatment can dramatically reduce the risk of blindness.
In England, all people aged 12 years and older with
type 1 or type 2 diabetes are offered diabetic retinopathy
screening at least annually by the Diabetic Eye Screening
Programme (DES). The test involves taking a photo-
graph of the retina, which occurs without contact with
the eye. The rate of uptake for screening is 81 % [5],
with a range from 7.4 % to 91.8 % across different Pri-
mary Care Trusts (PCTs) [6] (excluding the five PCTs
with the highest and lowest percentages, the range is
57.7 % to 87.0 %). Therefore, a number of people with
diabetes are still not being screened. This puts them at
risk of developing avoidable sight loss, and is also a
waste of resources in the National Health Service
(NHS), due to missed appointments. Although the DES
has been an unqualified success, the effectiveness of any
program depends on its uptake.
Screening uptake varies geographically, and is often poor
in socially deprived areas, which can exacerbate existing in-
equalities in health outcomes. For example, in the UK, dia-
betes prevalence was seen to increase with increasing
deprivation, while the probability of attending diabetic ret-
inopathy screening decreases and the prevalence of sight-
threatening diabetic retinopathy among screened patients
increases [7]. Since the effectiveness of any screening
program is linked to the uptake by the population (and in
particular uptake by those most at risk), simple, cost-
effective strategies are required to realize the financial and
social benefits of available sight-saving interventions, and to
do this in an equitable way.
Increasing screening uptake is a challenge that can be
addressed by considering other behavioral challenges in
health. Reducing morbidity and mortality in the future is
likely to depend as much on motivating changes in behav-
ior as on developing new treatments or technologies, and
many countries and health systems are now directing re-
sources to this end [8, 9]. Consistent with this emphasis
on preventative healthcare, screening programs currently
exist in a number of other clinical areas, such as breast
cancer, cervical cancer and abdominal aortic aneurysm,
however, uptake can be poor. The ultimate success of a
high-quality screening program depends on the uptake
rate within the target population and novel solutions are
required to meet the challenge of achieving this.
Recent interest has been shown in using financial in-
centives such as cash or vouchers, to promote desirable
health behaviors (e.g. exercise, healthy eating) and dis-
courage unhealthy ones (e.g. smoking, poor diet), and in
using principles from behavioral economics to design
public health interventions [10–12]. Success has been
seen previously where insights from behavioral econom-
ics have been applied – namely in the areas of medica-
tion adherence and encouraging weight loss [13, 14], as
there is good evidence that our response to incentive
schemes can be shaped by predictable mental shortcuts.
Even small incentives can positively influence choices
[15], and intelligent design of incentive schemes using
principles from behavioral economics will be a key strat-
egy to cost-effectively reduce the economic and social
costs of unhealthy behavior [16].
Financial incentives have been seen to be more ef-
fective in increasing performance of infrequent behav-
iors (e.g. vaccinations) rather than in more sustained
behaviors (e.g. smoking) [15, 17]. As screening usually
requires discrete one-off behaviors, incentives may be
particularly effective in increasing their uptake. Other
examples include programs to offer vouchers to
young women who attend cervical smear testing [18].
Offering vouchers can reduce loss-to-follow-up in
women who have had an abnormal cervical smear
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test. Since financial based incentives for healthy be-
havior are already being used, for example by large
employers or health insurance providers [19–22], we
require evidence that they work, and if they do,
which method is most cost effective. This will avoid
wasting public resources.
While some feel that financial incentives are contro-
versial as they may be a form of coercion, appropriately
targeted incentives can reduce inequalities in health out-
comes [12, 15, 23]. Furthermore, as people often do not
act in line with their intentions [24], financial incentives
have been proposed as a way to help people’s actions
align more closely with their true preferences, and there-
fore to enhance as opposed to restrict autonomy [25]. A
survey of patients with diabetes found that while some
had strong concerns about incentives, many people sup-
ported the principle of incentivizing good behaviors, and
more people were more in favor of vouchers, or small
cash payments as opposed to larger payments [26]. Sup-
port for incentives was more common in those aged be-
tween 40 and 64, and in more deprived groups. A recent
review of studies on acceptability of financial incentives
for health behaviors found that incentives tend to be ac-
ceptable if they are effective and cost-effective, and if
they benefit recipients and wider society [27].
This study will investigate the applicability of behav-
ioral economics and financial incentives to increasing
diabetic retinopathy screening uptake in non-attenders,
by testing the impact and cost-effectiveness of two dif-
ferent incentive schemes. This randomized controlled
trial takes place in London, which has both high and low
levels of deprivation and specific populations with poor
attendance. This study would represent one of the first
robust investigations of the use of incentives in diabetic
eye screening, and of incentives specifically inspired by
behavioral economics [28, 29]. The results will be of par-
ticular interest to policy makers running screening pro-
grams and seeking cost-effective ways to increase
uptake, but could have a wider impact amongst those
looking to change behavior in other health domains.
Research questions
In this study we will compare two different incentive
schemes for diabetic retinopathy screening, with a usual-
care control group, to determine:
1. Are incentives an effective strategy to encourage
participation in the screening programme?
While screening for diabetic retinopathy is an
effective strategy for reducing blindness, to be cost-
effective the screening programme requires good
attendance. However, attendance rates could be
improved. This study will investigate whether targeted
financial incentives can increase screening participation.
2. Does the design of the financial incentive scheme
affect its effectiveness in influencing participation in
health screening?
There are many ways in which incentives to
encourage screening participation could be
delivered. Two different types of financial incentive
will be compared to see which is most effective: a
fixed £10 incentive, or a prize draw with a 1 in 100
chance of winning £1000.
3. Does the choice of incentive scheme, if successful,
attract patients who have a different demographic or
socioeconomic status to those who attend screening
regularly?
A particular concern is that those in deprived socio-
economic groups are less likely to attend screening
[7, 30], exacerbating existing inequalities in health.
By investigating the impact of our incentive schemes
on the demographic profile of those who attend, we
hope to learn more about the way in which incen-
tives might be developed to target specific health
inequalities. We will obtain information about age,
gender, postcode and hence social deprivation status,
and distance from screening center.
4. Is offering incentives a cost-effective strategy for
enhancing participation?
In the current financial environment it is also
important to ensure that any interventions are cost-
effective. Economic evaluation using well-established
economic models will be performed to determine
value for money.
Methods
Study population and eligibility
Eligible participants will be identified from the Diabetic
Eye Screening Programme (DES) prior to commence-
ment of the study by 1st Retinal Screen Ltd (who at the
time of the study were providing the DES service in the
Kensington, Chelsea and Westminster Clinical Commis-
sioning Groups in West London). Participants will be
patients aged sixteen years and older, who have been in-
vited to screening in the last 24 months on a yearly
basis, but who have failed to attend or to have contacted
the screening service to rearrange an appointment. A
minimum two month period will be left between any of
the standard invitation letters and enrolment into the
trial to ensure that patients are not enrolled who are late
to contact the screening service but who still intend to
do so. Due to contractual requirements, the normal, an-
nual invite process will continue for trial participants.
Study design and procedure
The study design will be a three-arm randomized con-
trolled trial. The effect of two different types of financial
incentives will be compared to a control group with no
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incentives. The list of eligible participants identified by
1st Retinal Screen Ltd will be randomized by the statisti-
cian (according to an anonymous identifier), prior to the
start of the study. No personal information about partic-
ipants will be shared by 1st Retinal Screen Ltd. For n eli-
gible participants provided in the list, they will be
indexed according to numbers generated at random with
double precision, to avoid duplicates. Participants will
then be sorted from smallest to largest according to this
random index. Within the sorted list and using the
1.4:1:1 randomisation ratio, we will assign: (1) the lowest
n/3.4 participants to the fixed incentive group; (2) the
following n/3.4 participants to the probabilistic incentive
group; and (3) the remainder of the participants to the
control group. We will round n/3.4 to the closest inte-
ger, if needed. Participants will be sent a letter by 1st
Retinal Screen Ltd inviting them to their appointment,
however they will be able to reschedule this appointment
once (by phoning a number given on the letter), and still
be eligible for the incentive. The letter sent will be deter-
mined by the intervention condition to which partici-
pants are assigned; these are described below.
The study will take place at a DES clinic based within
St Mary’s Hospital, Imperial College Healthcare NHS
Trust, in London, UK. Dedicated clinics will be arranged
for trial participants, and for each of the intervention
groups, so that non-trial patients are not aware of incen-
tives offered to trial patients, and so participants within
different groups are not aware of the different incentive
conditions. A researcher will be present at the screening
sessions for the intervention groups, in order to be able
to answer any questions about the incentive, and to give
the cash incentive to those in the fixed incentive group.
As there will be designated clinics for each intervention
group, it will not be possible for the researcher or
screener to be blinded to the group assignment. How-
ever, as attendance at the clinic is the primary outcome,
the study results cannot be biased by the lack of blinding
at this stage. The study procedure is shown in Fig. 1.
Conditions
The design of the intervention conditions took into ac-
count established psychological phenomenon from Pro-
spect Theory (for which Daniel Kahneman was awarded
the 2002 Nobel prize in economics [28]). In particular,
the two intervention conditions were based on the in-
sights of ‘reference points’ and ‘overweighting of small
probabilities’. The incentive vouchers will also contain
expiry dates of the date of the screening, to introduce
some aspect of ‘loss aversion’, whereby losing a reward is
more powerful than gaining a reward [31].
Both incentive letters were shown to patients within
Westminster Diabetes User Group, and they were deemed
to be acceptable. There was also a patient representative
within the trial management team, who assisted with and
approved the letter design.
Control group
Participants in this group will receive the standard invi-
tation letter from the Screening Service, which invites
patients to a fixed appointment at a particular date and
time (there is a number to call if patients need to re-
arrange their appointment). The letter will be sent four
weeks before the appointment date.
Fixed incentive group
Participants in this group receive the standard invitation
letter as in the control group, however this will include
additional text and a voucher offering a financial incen-
tive of £10 after screening is completed. The voucher is
shown in Fig. 2.
This amount of £10 was chosen due to the idea of refer-
ence points, which can be illustrated by the finding that
offering a very small incentive is effective at encouraging
people to pick up their HIV test result, but increasing the
value of the incentive has little effect [32]. Therefore, the
intervention will offer an incentive of £10 (equivalent to
minimal hourly wage for UK workers >21), to cover the
opportunity cost to the patient in terms of their time or
travel costs.
Probabilistic incentive group
Participants in this group will receive the standard invi-
tation letter, including additional text and a voucher of-
fering entry into a prize draw for a 1 in 100 chance of
winning £1000 following attendance at screening.
This condition was designed with an understanding of
the phenomena that people overvalue small probabil-
ities, which explains the popularity of lotteries and insur-
ance [28]. It has been demonstrated that given fixed
resources in an incentive programme, it can be more ef-
fective to offer lotteries, compared to smaller individual
rewards [33]. We will offer a lottery where the expected
value matches the incentive level offered in the other
study condition. It may be that overweighting of small
probabilities will make a lottery offering e.g., '1 % chance
for £1000' more attractive than £10 for certain, so the
former may be a more effective incentive for participa-
tion in screening.
To inform the intervention design, a survey was
conducted of over fifty patients who attended the
vascular and diabetic foot clinics at Imperial College
Healthcare NHS Trust. Each was asked which of the
following incentives was most attractive for them
personally:
(a) £5 for sure
(b)A 1 in 10 chance of winning £50
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(c) A 1 in 100 chance of winning £500
(d)A 1 in 1000 chance of winning £5000
All patients either answered (a) or (d). There was no
one who thought that the answers (b) or (c) were more
attractive. This suggests that patients fall into two
groups – ‘risk avoiders’ and ‘risk seekers’, as defined rela-
tively to the available set of choice options. (See [34], for
discussion of evidence for such relativity of risk prefer-
ences.) We have chosen incentives with lottery odds 1 in
100 (1 %) chance of winning a monetary prize, and not
smaller probability (1 in 1000), because people have cog-
nitive difficulties in comprehending, and dealing with,
very small probabilities (see [28]). Therefore, because it
is difficult to conceptualise what 1 in 1000 chance
means, individuals may ignore the odds and focus only
on the prize, which may induce further nonlinearities in
behavior in addition to probability overweighting. The
magnitude of the offered prize in the probabilistic incen-
tive group (£1000) was selected so that it is multiple of
the £10 payoff offered in the other intervention condi-
tion: if there is a 100 % chance to get £10 in the fixed in-
centive group (justified on the grounds of real time and
travel costs), then it makes fair sense to offer £1000
when the probability is hundred times smaller (i.e. the
‘expected value’ of the incentive is the same in both
Fig. 1 Flow diagram of study procedure. There will be oversampling at the randomisation stage, to allow for the sample size to be reached even
if patients become ineligible between randomisation and the invitation letter being sent
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conditions). This amount is also the highest lottery in-
centive that could be offered based on the number of
people in the trial.
The prize draw will be conducted using a computer
program giving each participant an exact 1 in 100 prob-
ability of winning. The probabilistic incentive voucher is
shown in Fig. 3. To ensure that a prize is awarded, as re-
quired for legal reasons, if none of the participants who
attend win the prize following the individual draws, then
one participant will be chosen at random as the winner,
from all participants who attended from the probabilistic
incentive group. When a winner of the probabilistic in-
centive is identified, their contact details will be given to
the researcher by 1st Retinal Screen Ltd. and they will
be sent a letter to arrange payment of the £1000 prize.
Measures
The primary endpoint is the proportion of invitees who at-
tend screening in each incentive group. This anonymised
information will be extracted from the Screening Service
database. For those participants who attend their screen-
ing appointment, data on their screening outcome score
will be collected, aggregated by intervention group.
Demographic information will be collected for all in-
vited participants on age, deprivation score and distance
from screening center. Age data will given in deciles,
starting from the lowest eligible age of 16 (i.e. 16–25,
26–35 etc.) with those aged 86 years and over being in
the highest category. Deprivation scores will be mea-
sured based on the Indices of Multiple Deprivation score
[35], which is based on postcodes, and will use the ad-
dress to which the invitation is posted. This data will be
given in deciles to ensure participant confidentiality. Dis-
tance to screening site will be measured based on the
straight-line distance between the address on the day of
screening, and the screening site, rounded to the nearest
kilometre. Baseline demographics will also be collected
for: gender, years registered, and years since last
attended screening.
If participants telephone the screening center to opt
not to participate in screening, the reason(s) provided
will be recorded.
In all groups, when patients arrive, the screener will
ask them for any reasons why they have not attended
their past few appointments, in order to see if there are
differences between intervention groups, and to explore
common barriers to attendance in this hard-to-reach
Fig. 3 Image of voucher added to the invitation letter for the probabilistic incentive group. The following text was also added to the standard
letter: We know that some patients invited for diabetic eye screening do not attend their appointment. Imperial College London is looking to see
whether financial incentives help people to attend, and this work is being conducted through our clinics. Once you have been screened, you will
be entered into a prize draw where you will have a 1 in 100 chance of winning £1000. Please bring this letter with you when you attend your
screening appointment. If you have any questions about the financial incentive, please email (address)
Fig. 2 Image of voucher added to the invitation letter for the fixed incentive group. The following text was also added to the standard letter: We
know that some patients invited for diabetic eye screening do not attend their appointment. Imperial College London is looking to see whether
financial incentives help people to attend, and this work is being conducted through our clinics. Once you have been screened, you can exchange this
voucher for £10 cash. Please bring this letter with you when you attend your screening appointment. If you have any questions about the financial
incentive, please email (address)
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group. Reasons given will be noted in a table containing
common reasons for non-attendance, along with the
intervention group assignment. The reasons suggested
are those given by patients in some informal telephone
research conducted by 1st Retinal Screen Ltd (shown in
Table 1).
Following completion of the study, the dataset will be
generated by the data manager at 1st Retinal Screen Ltd,
given a database search of their system to extract all
relevant attendance and demographic data.
Sample size calculation
The primary endpoint is the proportion of the study
group who attend their diabetic retinopathy screening
appointment. As the study group will comprise patients
who have not attended screening for at least two years,
including some who have never attended, despite previ-
ous interventions to encourage them to attend, this is a
very hard to reach population. Attendance in the control
group is expected to be extremely low, such as a nom-
inal 1 %. As the eligible study population also tends to
be the sickest, with the greatest risk of having retinop-
athy, and of losing their sight, even a small increase in
attendance would have clinical and social benefit.
An increase in attendance of 10 % was deemed clinic-
ally significant. A 10 % increase was also considered
achievable, as a study found that smoking cessation rates
among employees of a large company increased from
5 % to 14.7 % with financial incentives [36], and in an-
other study, warfarin adherence among subjects requir-
ing anticoagulation management improved from 65 % to
97.8 % with a lottery based financial incentive [14]. With
two intervention groups, each being compared to the
control group, maximum statistical efficiency is achieved
by randomising 1.4:1:1. Combining this with an assumed
increase in attendance of 10 %, from 1 % in the control
arm to 11 % in an intervention arm, there would be
95 % power if 1000 participants were recruited in total
(412 in the control group, and 294 in each of the inter-
vention groups). This sample size would also give the
study at least 85 % power to detect a smaller increase
from 1 % to 7.5 %, which would also be a clinically sig-
nificant improvement in attendance rates. Should at-
tendance in the control group turn out to be 5 %, the
study would still have approximately 85 % power to de-
tect an increase in attendance of 10 % to a level of 15 %
in an intervention group [37].
Data from 1st Retinal Screen Ltd suggests that the study
group could comprise over 1000 patients. This would allow
oversampling at the randomisation stage, so that the
intended sample size will still be reached even if partici-
pants become ineligible following randomisation (the most
common reason for this is most likely to be due to partici-
pants attending their routine screening appointments).
Statistical analysis
Summary statistics
The primary outcome will be the count and proportion
of attenders (i.e. attendance rate) by treatment group
and demographics.
Secondary data will be the sight outcome scores from
the screening test, aggregated by treatment group. This
can be classified as disease compared to no disease, or
sight outcome (annual recall, digital surveillance, refer to
ophthalmology, refer to ophthalmology-urgent).
Those who become ineligible after randomisation and
before receiving the invitation letter will be excluded
from the analysis due to no longer meeting study inclu-
sion criteria. However, a distribution of number becom-
ing ineligible by treatment group, as well as reasons for
ineligibility will be provided. Some participants may be-
come ineligible after receiving the invitation letter, yet it
can be assumed that the letter itself does not cause ineli-
gibility, and so would occur at random across the experi-
mental conditions. Therefore participants becoming
ineligible after receiving the invitation letter will be
excluded from the analysis.
The count and proportion of participants opting
not to participate, or rearranging appointments, will
be presented by reasons provided, as well as accord-
ing to treatment group and demographics. If partici-
pants rearrange more than one appointment, they
become ineligible for the incentive, and would be
counted as a non-attender (even those in the control
group). The count and proportion of participants who
Table 1 Suggested reasons for past non-attendance
Suggested reasons for non-attendance
Forgot
Didn't know had an appointment
Didn't get round to coming
Was out of the country
Started experiencing problem with eyes
Did not feel obviously had problems with eyes
Couldn't get time off work
Didn't understand why needed to be screened
Thought optician did it
Family commitments
Too ill to attend
Seen privately
Problems with transport
Do not consider themselves diabetic
Under the care of Hospital Eye Services
Other - please specify
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were classified as non-attenders for this reason will
be provided, and they will also be included in a sensi-
tivity analysis for comparison, where they will be clas-
sified as attenders.
Pairwise comparisons
After summary statistics are analyzed, pairwise compari-
sons of success, or attendance, rates (absolute risk differ-
ences) will be performed between the following groups
using Chi-square tests adjusting for multiple comparisons:
 Control vs. Fixed incentive
 Control vs. Lottery incentive
 Fixed vs. Lottery incentive
Risk differences and risk ratios (i.e., relative risks),
along with their 95 % confidence intervals, will be pre-
sented to assess whether any significant differences be-
tween groups exist. This analysis will address the first
two research questions of whether financial incentives,
and then the design of the incentive scheme have an im-
pact on screening attendance.
Further analyses will be conducted to explore the third
research question about whether the incentive schemes
attract patients with a different socioeconomic or demo-
graphic status. Although groups will be checked after
randomisation on the basis of demographic factors, an
exploratory subgroup analysis will be performed for ad-
justment of treatment effect by accounting for the avail-
able demographic covariates listed above using a
multivariate logistic regression analysis, and performing
model selection using a backward stepwise removal
process based on a 0.05 significance level; covariate-
adjusted differences in success, or attendance, rates be-
tween treatment groups will be computed. Significant as-
sociations will be identified by those with p-values < 0.05,
while possible trends toward significance will be identified
from 0.05 ≤ p-values < 0.10. With anticipated relatively low
success rates globally, resulting estimates from these sub-
group analyses could be unstable [38, 39], hence affecting
possible reliability of the estimates which is why we
emphasize the exploratory subgroup analysis.
To answer the third research question, comparisons will
also be made to those who are classified as regular
‘current’ attenders (i.e., those who have attended at least 2
appointments in the past 3 years) to assess possible differ-
ences through demographic covariates and secondary out-
come data between regular attenders and non-attenders.
Cost-effectiveness analysis
In order to investigate the fourth research question
about the cost-effectiveness of the interventions, a health
economics analysis will be conducted. The trial results
will provide data on the differential rate of attendance to
screening for each group. To assess the short-term cost-
effectiveness of the incentives, the cost per additional
screening attendee will be calculated as the cost of
screening divided by the observed increase in the num-
ber of screening attendees for each pairwise comparison
of groups.
A longer-term, 5 year, perspective of the cost-
effectiveness of the incentives will be assessed using a
Markov model. The model will assess the cost-
effectiveness from the NHS perspective using the differ-
ential rates of screening attendance for each group. The
long-term effects of attending screening in terms of the
sensitivity of screening, treatment costs and quality of
life, as well as the long-term effects of not attending
screening, will be determined from the published litera-
ture. The costs across the groups will differ only in the
monetary incentives provided.
The analysis pertaining to the third research question
will indicate if the incentives for attending screening are
associated with individual characteristics. If this is the
case, the published literature will be consulted to deter-
mine if the significant characteristic(s) also impact on the
costs and/or quality of life of individuals with diabetes. If
so, this will be reflected in the modelling of future costs
and quality of life. Sensitivity analysis will be conducted to
determine the impact upon cost-effectiveness of changes
in the key parameters within the model.
Ethical approval
The sponsor for the study is Imperial College London.
The study has been reviewed by the London Riverside
National Health Service Research Ethics Committee,
from which it received a favourable opinion (reference
number 14/LO/1779).
Consent
Informed consent will not be obtained from research
participants. This is similar to other screening trials, as
it is not possible to gain informed consent before the
screening invitations are sent out. Furthermore, if
patients were aware of what is being investigated in the
trial, it would jeopardise the reliability of the findings.
The London Riverside National Health Service Research
Ethics Committee waived the need for study participants
to provide informed consent as part of the approval
process. However, following the conclusion of the trial,
patients will be informed by letter that they were in-
cluded in a trial, and informed of the results.
Trial management
The study has been funded by the National Institute for
Health Research (NIHR), Health Services and Delivery
Research Programme, project number 12/64/112. The
research was supported by the NIHR Biomedical
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Research Centre based at Imperial College Healthcare
NHS Trust and Imperial College London. The study was
registered with ISRCTN on 25 February 2016, with
number 14896403. The protocol is version 1.5, dated 4
August 2015. The trial sponsor assisted with obtaining
ethical approvals for the study, will assist with any
protocol modifications, and conduct any auditing or
monitoring of the trial here necessary.
The conduct of the trial will be managed by the trial
management team (TMT) comprising individuals from
a broad range of areas of expertise relevant to the study.
The TMT will meet regularly to discuss trial progress,
deal with any reported adverse events, and produce out-
puts for scientific and public dissemination given the re-
sults of the study. A subset of the TMT with expertise
in data analysis will agree any changes to the analysis
plan, and monitor the data management. TMT mem-
bers from 1st Retinal Screen Ltd, Imperial College
London and the statistician will have access to the
dataset.
Discussion
This study is a novel, randomized controlled trial to in-
vestigate the impact of two different types of financial
incentives on increasing attendance at diabetic retinop-
athy screening. The design of the incentives has been
based on established principles from behavioral econom-
ics [40]. This intervention therefore has the potential to
reduce unnecessary sight loss, and to generate large sav-
ings in public funds.
Based on the ‘Future Sight Loss’ report [41] and data
from the NHS Diabetic Eye Screening website [42], we es-
timate potential societal savings in the UK of £1.6 million
if the £10 is successful in increasing take-up of screening
by 10 %. From these reports, it was estimated that 0.94 %
of patients are at risk of blindness due to diabetic retinop-
athy, and the rate of blindness amongst those at risk is
30.5 %. Therefore, if 10 % of the estimated 448,000 indi-
viduals with diabetes who fail to attend screening annually
were to attend due to the incentive, this would correspond
to detection of 423 people who would have been at risk of
blindness, and prevention of 129 cases of blindness. Given
the annual, per person cost of blindness and sight loss is
£12,466 the potential economic savings of reducing
screening non-attendance is £1,608,114. The cost of
screening the 1,000 study subjects is estimated to be
£20,700. The cost of providing a £10 incentive to the total
sample will be £10,000. Thus a rough estimate of the over-
all potential saving, if the study is successful in improving
screening, is £1,577,414.
As there is evidence of public support for incentive
schemes that are effective and cost-effective [27], if this
intervention has the expected impact, it may be an
acceptable way to prevent unnecessary blindness due to
diabetic retinopathy.
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